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Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl 1
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Abstract. Financial regulators should use cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to evaluate
financial regulations. Finance is an ideal domain for CBA because the direct costs and
benefits of financial activity can be easily monetized, and a huge amount of data exists
for calculating the relevant valuations. John Coates and others have argued that in fact the
valuations are too difficult to determine because of unique features of financial markets
that distinguish them from other types of markets where CBA is used. We respond that
these features are present in other markets, and that financial valuations are difficult to
determine at present only because academic research on them is at an early stage.

In two recent articles, we urged financial regulators to use cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to
evaluate financial regulations. 2 John Coates has emerged as a leading critic of this view. 3 Doubts
can also be found in a recent paper by Jeffrey Gordon. 4 In this Essay, we survey their objections
and respond to them.
We make several points. First, Coates conflates two separate issues: the advisability of
CBA and the uncertainty of valuations. He argues that because scholars have so far disagreed
about relevant valuations, regulators should not engage in CBA. However, he exaggerates the
difficulty of determining valuations. The current level of uncertainty justifies greater investment
in academic research, not abandonment of CBA.
Second, Coates makes a series of theoretical arguments that valuation difficulties do not
arise merely from the paucity of academic research but from the nature of financial markets. He
argues that financial markets are “central,” “social,” and “non-stationary” in a way that other
markets are not, and this explains why valuation problems cannot be surmounted. Gordon makes
a similar argument that CBA of financial regulations cannot work because financial markets are
“constructed” or artificial. We argue the opposite: that because financial markets generate a huge
amount of data, and because most of the relevant valuations are monetary in nature, financial
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regulations are ideal for CBA, much more than regulations of the environment and health and
safety.
Third, Coates fails to provide plausible alternatives to CBA. In some places, he advocates
“expert judgment,” which is an empty if not circular standard for evaluating regulations, and
could easily be abused in ways that would reduce the transparency of policy-making. In other
places, he advocates “conceptual CBA,” which we believe is also inferior to conventional
(quantitative) CBA. Gordon advocates “pragmatism.” These are not self-defining terms; nor is it
clear why anyone would consider them attractive. We survey these and other alternatives to
CBA, and argue that none of them is a normatively defensible alternative to CBA.
Finally, Coates claims that judicial review would “camouflage” discretionary choices by
regulators rather than discipline them. Many other scholars have criticized judicial review that
demands that financial regulators perform CBAs. We are more sympathetic with this argument
than with Coates’ other arguments. However, our view is that the problem with judicial review is
not that it leads to camouflage; it is that judges are not likely to be sophisticated consumers of
CBA. We thus argue for further development of institutional support for CBA in the executive
branch, which should draw on the expertise of private consultancies. Judicial review can be
limited to ensuring that regulators take advantage of that support once it is in place.
I. Criticisms and Responses
A. Uncertainty of Financial Valuations
To perform a CBA of a proposed financial regulation, regulators must be able to draw on
financial data in order to determine the relevant valuations. If the data do not exist, are noisy, or
if no plausible identification strategy has been developed, regulators will not be able to
determine valuations with any confidence. This creates a dilemma. Regulators may be unable to
regulate even when it is widely understood that regulation is socially desirable; or they may
regulate but then they must disregard CBA and rely on guesswork.
Consider bank capital requirements. Banks are required to maintain a ratio of equity to
assets. Should this ratio be 4 percent or 5 percent, or higher? Should different types of equity and
different types of assets be treated differently for purposes of calculating the ratio? Should the
ratio depend on the type of bank—whether it is large or small, national or regional, too big to fail
or not too big to fail?
To answer these questions, a regulator must first determine the cost burden of various
ratios (and also of different risk-weighting systems, but we will ignore this complication to keep
the exposition clear). As the capital requirement increases, the bank must raise interest rates,
which will result in less lending and lower profits. Calculating the lost profits is a straightforward
exercise. Since interest rates constantly rise and fall, and banks thus constantly adjust lending
practices, ample data are available to calculate the effect on profits. 5
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The benefits side of the analysis is more challenging. The major variables are (1) the
reduction in the probability of a financial crisis resulting from an incremental increase in the
capital ratio; and (2) the economic cost of a financial crisis. The economic cost of a financial
crisis in turn depends on how well the government responds to the financial crisis, so one must
calculate the cost of a financial crisis conditional on a weak government response, the cost of a
financial crisis conditional on a strong government response, and the probability distribution of
strong and weak responses.
Are the data available? Many countries have experienced financial crises in recent
history, and so researchers have been able to estimate the relationship between those countries’
regulatory regimes (including capital requirements), the frequency of their financial crises, and
the severity of the economic downturns. The question about whether reliable valuations can be
used boils down to whether there are enough data that exhibit sufficient regularities or not.
Coates believes that the data are too sparse and noisy. To prove this point, he shows that
different studies make different estimates of the relevant variables across large ranges. 6
We are less impressed by this variation than he is. Our starting point is that a regulator
must make these estimates, at least implicitly. If the Fed chooses a 5 percent capital requirement,
then all the valuations can be backed out of this rule. As we have seen, the costs to banks can be
estimated; once those costs are estimated, the 5 percent number will be consistent with a
relatively narrow range of expected benefits in the form of avoided financial crises. Then the
question arises whether the Fed’s implicit expected benefit in this hypothetical example is
consistent with the studies that Coates mentions. Given the range of studies, no doubt the Fed
can find one that supports it. But then the question is whether that study is plausible. We believe
it is far better that the public and economists know which studies are currently driving policy so
that one can criticize the policy if the studies are flawed and support it if they are not. Otherwise
one is left guessing which parameters are being drawn from where, greatly inhibiting the
progress of academic research on policy-relevant topics and thus the quality of policy-making.
Furthermore, Coates takes a far too static view of academic research. That the studies
generate a range of valuations does not mean that all valuations are equally good. Researchers
can criticize studies because they make unreasonable assumptions, or are sensitive to
controversial assumptions, use bad data, employ the wrong methodologies, and so on. Problems
that are identified in existing studies stimulate more research. The sorts of choices that Coates
condemns as arbitrary, like the definition of financial crisis for coding purposes, are ubiquitous
in social science and even scientific research. Often, they can be addressed straightforwardly
with additional research. When multiple studies are conducted, it will often be reasonable to
discard outliers as statistical artifacts.
We would require the Fed to perform and disclose its cost-benefit analysis so that the
numbers it implicitly relies on can be scrutinized by academics. The Fed should also sponsor
additional research that evaluates its assumptions and methods. Even if, in the end, a huge range
he confuses the problem of calculating the costs to banks (which is simple) and social costs, which means
performing the entire cost-benefit analysis. Coates, supra note XX, at 67-68.
6
Id. at 60.
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of valuations exists, and the Fed has no choice but to choose a valuation from within the range,
the exercise is valuable because it shows where additional research is necessary. CBA itself will
not impose much discipline in those circumstances, but the Fed will need to justify in a
qualitative sense why it chose a valuation from one part of the range rather than another. Over
time, as the Fed continues to adjust the capital ratio, this precedent will help constrain it. If it
traditionally chooses from the middle of the range, and then one day chooses an outlier, people
will demand an explanation. The Fed should be required to provide one. This can only improve
the quality of regulation.
The problem of uncertain valuations is a commonplace of regulation. 7 Indeed, finance is
less about individuals’ subjective valuations than are other areas of regulation. Environmental
regulations are famously plagued by the problem of valuing intangible assets, such as the
existence value of dramatic views and the preservation of unique species of insects, for which no
plausible methodology of any kind presently exists. 8 It has been difficult for regulators to attach
valuations to the risk of death, the discomfort of illness, the loss of recreational opportunities,
and the pleasure of inhaling clean rather than dirty air. While some mechanisms in finance may
be complex, almost all benefits and costs can be measured in terms of utility functions over
money, the area of economics with the longest history (dating at least back to the 17th century)
and the area most firmly understood by economists.
B. The Centrality of Finance
Coates argues that financial regulators should not use CBA because “finance is at the
heart of the economy.” 9 This argument is paradoxical. CBA is a costly procedure for generating
greater information to make policy-making in an area more precise. A plausible argument against
CBA is that an area of regulation is so peripheral to the economy that investments in improving
policy-making in that area are not worth making. Indeed, this view is reflected in the
longstanding rule that only “major” regulations require CBA—those with an annual economic
impact of at least $100 million. But an area being central to the economy is precisely what
justifies making such investments. Thus we view the centrality of finance as an important
motivation for CBA of financial regulations.
It becomes clear that Coates is worried about a slightly different problem. All regulations,
and not just financial regulations, have complex causal effects. Consider a regulation that
requires factories to install scrubbers. The regulation has certain, easily identifiable “first-order”
effects. The factory must pay money for scrubbers. The reduction in pollution enhances human
health. But the regulation also has more complicated “second-order” effects. Companies that
manufacture scrubbers will make larger profits, while doctors will lose profits. The factory
owner might pass on costs to consumers, resulting in higher prices, or to workers, resulting in
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lower wages. Consumers and workers then might purchase fewer goods, hurting still others
farther down the causal chain, who in turn will change their behavior, and so on.
This is a generic problem for CBA, 10 and so three points must be made. First, like much
of Coates’ argument, it is better interpreted as a critique of CBA rather than as a critique of
financial CBA. Second, this is a problem for all forms of regulation, and in fact all forms of
economic analysis, not just for CBA. Coarse assumptions and rules of thumb must attend to
second-order and third-order effects if they are significant as suggested in recent work on general
equilibrium effects in CBA of other areas of regulation. 11 Third, nth-order effects tend to wash
out. A regulation that increases costs for consumers might cause them to spend less, but if the
same regulation reduces medical costs for other people, they will spend more. The farther down
one goes along the causal chain, the safer it is to ignore the effects of the regulation.
Coates’ argument can thus be reinterpreted as a more complicated claim that compared to
other areas of regulation, financial regulation will (1) have more nth-order effects, of (2) a
greater magnitude, (3) that cannot be expected to wash out, and (4) that cannot be reliably
identified and measured by regulators. He provides no justification for this conjecture, and it
seems to us very likely false. Consider antitrust regulation. The approval of a merger of two large
firms could have a huge number of large effects far down the causal chain, which are nearly
impossible to identify. Yet the consensus is that mergers can and should be subjected to CBA,
and they routinely are. Why? The answer is that the academic literature has progressed to a point
that researchers are confident that regulators can safely ignore many effects that are either small
or likely to wash out, depending on the structure of markets, and so should focus their attention
on certain effects—like economies of scale, product substitution, and so on. 12 Sometimes CBA
analysts will be wrong about this and discount an effect that is in fact very large; one of us has
written extensively about important effects that are commonly ignored in antitrust CBA. 13
However, because of the huge amount of information about prices and industrial behavior,
regulators can use statistical techniques that give them a reasonable amount of confidence about
their predictions and these techniques are continually improving the accuracy of policy precisely
because the existence of CBA provides incentives for such improvements. 14 This type of
information is available for financial markets as well, and this suggests that financial markets can
similarly be regulated with CBA and that the techniques for doing so will improve over time.
C. The Role of People and Social Groups in Finance
Coates argues that financial regulators should not use CBA because “the main units of
variation and change in finance are not things, or even individuals, but groups of people—groups
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with not only economic but also social and political relations.” 15 When a financial regulator
designs a regulation of a bank, it must predict how the people who operate the bank will adjust
the bank’s portfolio in response to the regulation. By contrast, an environmental regulator
focuses on chemistry and physics; it must predict how a change in a manufacturing process will
affect the chemistry of the air. While such a prediction is not necessarily easy, it can be based on
known physical laws and information derived from experiments in the lab.
Again, the distinction is overdrawn. Because financial markets usually involve a huge
number of sophisticated agents who have a very narrow objective (to make money), their
behavior can often be predicted. If a regulator increases minimum capital requirements beyond
banks’ current capital-asset ratios, banks will almost certainly respond by selling assets and
paying off debt. Their profits will decline, and so will their stock price. They are likely to raise
interest rates, and borrowers are likely to look for credit from financial institutions that are not
subject to the rules. Compared to other areas of economics like industrial organization which is
the foundation of antitrust CBAs, financial economics has a far stronger track record of accurate
prediction and precise mathematical modeling. 16
Of course, other effects, including the reduction of the risk of a financial crisis, will be
difficult to predict and measure. So will be the response of the government if a financial crisis
occurs. But these problems exist for regulation generically, and for non-financial CBA as well.
When financial regulators use “expert judgment” to determine minimum capital requirements,
they cannot avoid speculating about the effect of capital requirements on the probability of a
financial crisis. The “people” problem that Coates identifies is just the problem of regulating
people, as opposed to inanimate objects; it is not a problem that is specific to CBA or finance. It
is common to all social sciences, which form the basis for most policy. Moreover, environmental
regulators do not really regulate inanimate objects; they regulate people (and “groups”) as well.
When environmental regulators ban the use of chemical X as an input in a manufacturing
process, they must contend with the risk that producers will substitute to worse chemical Y or Z.
Or the risk that the higher prices will cause consumers to substitute to a worse form of behavior.
Consider, for example, the ubiquitous worry that excessive regulation of airline safety raises
prices, causing consumers to substitute to automobile travel, which is much more dangerous.
Even the problem of estimating how governments will respond to future events is not unique to
financial regulation: that problem is central to regulation of climate emissions where the cost of
mitigation—such as the construction of sea walls by governments—plays a significant role in
CBA. Regulators of all kinds cannot avoid regulating, and hence making predictions about the
behavior of people. That’s what they are supposed to do.
The weakness of Coates’ argument is particularly clear when one turns one’s attention to
antitrust regulation. Antitrust regulation is just regulation of people or groups as they buy and
sell from each other. In this respect, it is exactly the same as financial regulation. Antitrust
regulators do not deal with inanimate objects, cannot rely on the laws of chemistry and physics,
cannot conducts experiments in the lab. Yet CBA-based antitrust regulation is now entrenched.
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D. The “Non-Stationarity” of Finance
Coates argues that another problem with financial CBA is that, relative to CBA of
regulations of other areas of life, financial CBA must contend with the fact that “the underlying
regularities that enable quantification are commonly ‘non-stationary’ in finance—more likely to
change over time in finance than in other domains.” 17 Coates again cites the law of physics—
gravitational constants remain constant by definition and do not change over time—and
compares them with the changeability of financial patterns, like the dividend payout ratio.
But Coates is comparing apples and oranges. Physical laws constrain financial
transactions, which ultimately involve keystrokes, the movement of electronic impulses, and
other physical manifestations, just as they constrain rocket ships. A fairer comparison would be,
for example, changes in how firms manufacture pesticides and changes in how they lend money
to each other. Or consider changes in how people communicate with each other (by landline, by
cell phone, over the web, using email or Facebook or Twitter, and so on), which have accelerated
massively over the last decade. Or consider the agricultural industry, which is constantly
tinkering with the genetic composition of organisms. Or the pharmaceutical industry, which is
continuously modifying the chemical composition of drugs. Antitrust law must contend with the
constantly shifting organizational forms and contractual arrangements of business firms. CBA of
climate emission must contend with one of the most unstable and non-stationary systems known
to humankind: the earth’s climatic system. 18
The “underling regularities” in these industries are just as “non-stationary” as those in
finance. And so rather than conclude that CBA is impossible in the face of the Hereclitian flux,
we can learn from regulators of other industries how financial regulators should act in the face of
rapid change in the regulated activities. The major lesson that emerges is that regulators may
require agents to obtain regulatory approval before marketing a new device or process that might
cause widespread harm. The effect of this approach is to temporarily freeze the market. A
pharmaceutical company can invent whatever drugs it wants to, but it cannot market them until
after it receives FDA approval. The drug is held off the market, giving the FDA the time to
engage in a thorough review. We have advocated a similar approach to financial innovations. 19
There are other ways to deal with a rapidly changing environment. In tax law, the IRS
must address the same problem that financial regulators face: sophisticated agents constantly
invent new transactional structures that enable them to minimize tax burdens that they should
17
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bear. Because the IRS could not keep up, Congress finally passed laws that enabled courts to
penalize tax evaders ex post by imposing significant sanctions under broad standards. 20 These
standards are themselves based on cost-benefit (or, more precisely, cost-effectiveness principles):
they ban transactions with minimal economic substance. Similarly, financial regulators could
impose sanctions ex post based on cost-benefit principles.
Another straightforward response to the problem of “non-stationarity” is to provide
adequate staff and budgeting to regulatory agencies. This enables them to pay experts in the
industry to alert them to developments, hire researchers to analyze data, and monitor industry
players. Bank inspections that currently take place every six months or once a year could be
increased; inspections could be expanded to hedge funds and other financial agents that currently
operate in the shadows.
E. The Artificiality of Finance
Gordon argues that the financial economy is constructed from laws and regulations,
unlike the “real economy” of goods and services. Like Coates, Gordon thinks that CBA may be
appropriate for regulations that apply to physical process rather than social groups, but Gordon’s
major point is that because financial transactions are themselves endogenous to the regulatory
framework, further adjustments of the regulatory framework based on cost-benefit principles
would lead to bad or arbitrary outcomes.
We find this argument puzzling. Let’s consider Gordon’s thought-experiment. Imagine a
state of nature or lightly regulated state of nature, where people borrow and lend subject only to
the rules of property and contract law. Gordon seems to think that such a primitive financial
system could be regulated along cost-benefit principles. Presumably this means that if the
government fears that unregulated credit might lead to financial crisis, it could use cost-benefit
analysis to determine constraints—taxes or rules like minimum capital requirements—that reflect
the expected cost of a financial crisis.
Gordon’s major point is that modern financial markets reflect earlier regulatory choices.
Money market mutual funds exist today only because banks were forbidden to pay interest to
depositors in the 1970s. Pressure emerged for an alternative. Regulators allowed money market
mutual funds to pay interest as long as they invested in safe and liquid assets. As a consequence,
there were now two types of depository institutions, albeit subject to different rules. Later banks
were allowed to charge interest rates. Still later, they were allowed to combine with investment
banks. And so on.
Exactly why this complex pattern of regulation undermines cost-benefit analysis eludes
us, but we can make some conjectures. Suppose, for example, regulators decide, in light of the
financial crisis, that money market mutual funds are too risky. They consider some regulations
that would restrict their investments. On the cost side, the mutual funds would lose some money,
which could be estimated. Calculating the benefits will be more difficult. One problem is
estimating the effect on the probability of the financial crisis of a mutual fund industry that holds
20
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incrementally safer investments. Another problem—and this is what we think Gordon has in
mind—is that one would need to also estimate the change in the flow of funds. Some investors
would withdraw cash from mutual funds and invest them in other financial institutions. Some
investors will, at the margin, give up the benefits of liquidity in order to obtain a higher return.
Others might put the money in banks, where there are fewer restrictions on withdrawal. The
regulator thus would need to take into account the possibility that stricter regulation of mutual
funds would lead to more funds in other financial institutions—some of which are riskier or
more lightly regulated.
Can a regulator estimate these risks? A first point is that there is no reason in principle to
believe that such estimates are impossible. If they are hard, it is not because financial markets are
artificial rather than real; it is because financial markets are complicated. The problem that
Gordon identifies is just another species of regulatory arbitrage, similar again to the problem that
if the government regulates airplanes too strictly, consumers will substitute to more-dangerous
automobiles, and if they regulate automobiles too strictly, consumers will substitute to still more
dangerous bicycles. This type of behavior creates complex problems. Should the government
respond by regulating cars less strictly or by creating additional protections for bicyclists?
Regulatory arbitrage is ubiquitous. The right response is not to abandon cost-benefit analysis but
to try to anticipate arbitrage and counter it as it emerges and is identified.
II. Alternative Decision-Procedures
Critics of cost-benefit analysis must explain what alternative decision-procedure
regulators should use. In environmental, health, and safety regulation, alternatives do exist,
including risk-risk analysis, quality-adjusted life years (QALY), and feasibility analysis. None of
these alternatives makes much sense on their own terms, but they are particularly inappropriate
for financial regulation. Risk-risk and QALY analysis directs the regulator to consider the risks
of death and morbidity, risks that are not affected by financial transactions. Feasibility analysis
directs the regulator to choose the strictest regulation that does not cause excessive
unemployment. It is hard to imagine how such a decision-procedure could be used in financial
regulation, and no one has suggested that it should be.
Coates argues that financial regulators should use their “expert judgment”; he also argues
that they should use what he calls “conceptual CBA.” But neither of these proposals are
plausible. The invocation of expert judgment is circular. To see why, suppose the experts
themselves asked researchers how they can improve regulatory decision-making. If researchers
replied by telling them to use their “expert judgment,” the experts will be no more enlightened
than in the past. More to the point, the invocation of “expert judgment” is simply an expression
of confidence in the status quo and an invitation to complacency. “Expert judgment” did not
prevent the financial crisis from taking place; why should we defer to it?
Furthermore, if experts are allowed to make judgments without having to justify those
judgments and make explicit their assumptions, it both becomes more difficult for the public to
understand and challenge the reasoning and for future experts, attempting to learn from the past,
to make the best decisions going forward. A large cognitive psychology literature has shown that
experts like ordinary people make predictable errors in reasoning—overreacting to highly salient
9

events, for example. By forcing them to quantify and defend their assumptions, CBA can help
correct for these mistakes. 21
We are also puzzled by Coates’ confidence in “conceptual CBA.” In a paper mostly
devoted to attacking CBA, it is more than a surprise that at the end of the paper we learn that
regulators should use CBA after all. What is the difference between “conceptual CBA” and
ordinary CBA? We are not sure. One possibility is that “conceptual CBA” is an accounting
exercise rather than a decision-procedure. The regulator identifies the possible effects (or
possibly major effects) of a regulation but does not attempt to monetize them when valuations
cannot be determined. But then the question is how exactly the regulator determines whether to
regulate or not, or how strictly to regulate. Coates does not tell us. It cannot simply be the length
of the factors on each side; some weight must be put on each. And if such is done then that is
CBA, albeit of a very coarse form. If “conceptual CBA” is an accounting exercise rather than a
decision-procedure, it is not an alternative to ordinary CBA.
Another possibility is that conceptual CBA is a species of what one of us has called
“intuitive balancing.” 22 The regulator takes into account the possible effects of a regulation but
does not monetize them; it instead simply guesses whether the positive effects outweigh the
negative effects. Perhaps that is what regulators already do, but do we want regulation based on
guesswork? Coates denounces standard CBA for being “little more than guesswork” but then he
ends up endorsing “guesswork” in the form of conceptual CBA.
When CBA is based on uncertain calculations, conceptual CBA and ordinary CBA do not
differ. Under ordinary CBA, when there is a large range of valuations, the regulator is permitted
to choose a valuation within this range, assuming it provides a reasonable justification. OIRA
guidance documents for regulators that currently use CBA provides a variety of methods for
addressing uncertainty. 23 How conceptual cost-benefit analysis improves on these methods is
unclear. In cases where better data are available, conceptual CBA is clearly worse than ordinary
CBA as it fails to incorporate this greater precision by refusing to admit quantitative
measurements of factors and instead relying on guesswork.
Coates also invokes the Taylor Rule, but we do not see the relevance of this rule to his
argument. The Taylor Rule was determined inductively. For a number of years, the U.S.
economy enjoyed low inflation and high growth. During this period, the Fed raised and lowered
interest rates in a manner that turned out to be relatively consistent; the Taylor Rule describes the
Fed’s actions as a function of certain economic fundamentals. Whether or not the Taylor Rule
can be defended on the basis of an economic analysis, this type of inductive approach is plainly
inadequate. After all, the Fed’s actions must themselves have been based on some kind of
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decision-procedure. Since the Taylor Rule had not yet been formulated, those actions could not
have been based on the Taylor Rule.
Furthermore, few, if any, serious central bankers believe in a slavish adherence to the
Taylor Rule; we doubt Coates does either. Most serious macroeconomists believe it is at best a
good anchor for thinking about policy decisions. 24 Since the 2007 crash this rule has fallen into
even greater disfavor for its exclusive focus on unemployment and inflation, to the neglect of the
sort of “n-order” factors that Coates elsewhere claims are important, such as asset prices. In fact,
Coates’s sympathy towards such rules makes it hard to understand what he is advocating other
than opposing CBA; at one point he critiques CBA for considering too few factors and allowing
too little discretion; in the case of the Taylor Rule he appears to advocate far less discretion and
far more mechanical policy. Which way would he have it?
Capital adequacy rules also existed during this period of economic prosperity. Applying
the Taylor logic that Coates touts, we might accordingly infer that regulators should therefore
use those rules. But plainly the capital adequacy rules that existed during that period may not
have had a causal effect on economic conditions. While historical data may useful inform a
CBA, simply extending regulations that are correlated with past economic prosperity is a bad
idea.
Gordon suggests another approach to financial regulation, which he calls pragmatism.
The approach at first sounds similar to “conceptual CBA,” but Gordon goes further by arguing
that regulators can determine
subsidiary principles of pragmatic design, for example: minimize the extent to which
financial institutions can free-ride on systemic stability costs paid by others; provide
regulators with sufficient information to observe the consequences of their rules;
establish regulatory panopticons with authority only to observe the financial system as it
evolves and the non-exclusive responsibility of sounding the alarms; grant regulators the
power to make regulatory modifications. 25
One can dismiss several of these principles. Regulators already possess the power to make
regulatory modifications; the question is how they should determine whether to do so. And while
it makes sense to give regulators information and establish watchdogs, these proposals have
nothing to do with the question of whether CBA or some other decision-procedure is superior.
Let us focus on the first principle. We agree that regulators should stop financial
institutions from free-riding on systemic stability costs. But this just gets us back to where we
started. Only regulations can block financial institutions from free-riding, and the question is
what form those regulations should take. If they are too weak, then the goal will not be
accomplished. But if they are too strong, financial institutions, while blocked from free-riding,
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will also be unable to supply credit except at a cost that in aggregate harms society. Gordon
provides no guidance for making this tradeoff.
III. Judicial Review
Coates believes that judicial review of financial CBAs—whether they are “conceptual” or
ordinary CBAs—would be unwise. He argues that political constraints are sufficient to block
regulations that are clearly not cost-justified; CBA will not otherwise constrain regulators
because they can select from the wide range of valuations; indeed, regulators will use CBA to
camouflage their discretionary choices; CBA itself may not satisfy a cost-benefit test; experience
already shows that judicial review of CBA does not generate useful information; the materials
used to generate a CBA, including any interagency discussions, will create a larger record that
will be used against the regulator in litigation; regulators will go to Congress in order to obtain
statutory mandates so that they are not blocked by CBAs; and all of this will not provide
information to the public, will slow down regulation, deregulation, and regulatory reform,
increase polarization, and damage public confidence in the courts. 26
Chicken Little could hardly paint a bleaker picture. But it can’t be the case that CBA is so
flexible that regulators can do what they want while camouflaging their choices, and yet also
enables courts to strike down regulations for failing CBA. Nor is the limited experience with
financial regulation sufficient to draw firm conclusions about the viability of judicial review.
Much the same could have been said back in the early 1980s when formal CBA of
environmental, health, and safety regulations began. And Coates’ confidence in the status quo,
just a few years after a massive financial crisis that the regulators failed to anticipate, and in the
wake of a much-criticized reorganization of financial regulators, seems unwarranted. Indeed, the
lesson of many of his case studies is how poorly the regulators performed before the financial
crisis. Banks “were grossly undercapitalized” in 2008, he says; 27 yet he fails to draw the obvious
conclusion: that they were grossly undercapitalized because of the mistakes of regulators. Rather
than draw the obvious implication—that there is something wrong with how the regulators
operate—he argues that they should be left alone.
The question of whether courts should enforce CBA of financial regulations boils down
to the usual tradeoff between decision costs and error costs, and considerations of relative
institutional competence. If courts do not enforce CBA of financial regulations, then financial
regulators may continue to issue regulations that fail cost-benefit tests. These regulations may be
excessively strict or excessively lax, depending on whatever configuration of ideology, interest
group influence, and technical sophistication happens to influence a regulator at any given time.
Because most financial regulators are independent agencies, even a well-motivated president
may find it impossible to compel them to take CBA seriously. However, if courts do enforce
CBA, there is the risk that they will do a poor job, with the result that good regulations will be
struck down. Judges themselves may be unwilling to enforce CBA honestly because the judges
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are ideologically motivated, or they may not be able to understand how it works. At a theoretical
level, the tradeoff is indeterminate. 28
That said, we agree with Coates, albeit with less confidence, that judicial review is
premature at the current time. Given how little experience that financial regulators have with
CBA, a statutory requirement that they use CBA probably would bring financial regulation to a
halt, which we do not think is socially desirable. Instead, we would urge the executive branch to
exercise some leadership and begin a process of training financial regulators, setting standards,
and providing for an interagency review process modeled on OIRA. We also believe that
regulators should not bear the full burden of CBA: some burden should be borne by objecting
regulated parties, who should have to quantify their objections to regulations. Our proposal for
pre-approval regulation for new financial derivatives would put much of the burden for making
the case for a new product on the proposing party. 29
Conclusion
While there is much of value in Coates’ article, we would interpret it as an effort to guide
future research toward improvement of valuations for financial CBAs, not as a critique of CBA
of financial regulation. His theoretical arguments that financial regulation is unique, and hence
not susceptible to CBA unlike other types of regulation, are weak, and in fact suggest the
opposite. CBA is at least as well suited to financial regulation as to other forms of regulation,
and possible more suited. There are two reasons for this. First, economists understand financial
markets at least as well as scientists understand the environment or the human body. Consider
again the problems of climate change or of determining the impact of chemicals on health when
dose-response curves are incomplete. Second, the valuations relevant to financial CBAs are
almost all monetary, and thus easier to estimate than the valuations that are relevant to
environmental, health, and safety regulation, which frequently involve measuring the impact of
non-market goods on human well-being.
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